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 Racial violence and the politics of hate 
In January 2012, a 61-year-old taxi driver in Bedford, Mehar Dhariwal, was 
viciously beaten to the ground by a customer who kicked and punched him as he 
screamed racist abuse. Covered in blood, Mr Dhariwal was taken to a hospital but 
no scan was carried out and his broken ribs went undetected. A few days later he 
was dead. In July 2012, after moving to Barnsley, south Yorkshire, just six weeks 
before, a family of asylum seekers had to be rehoused. Youths had been throwing 
stones at the property, showering the family with glass. The mother, four months 
pregnant, had to be taken to hospital and later reported that her 3-year-old 
daughter was so traumatised that she barely ate. In November 2012, a father of a 
Muslim family who had just moved into their new home in Nottingham answered a 
knock at the door, to find a burning crucifix wrapped in ham on the doorstep. The 
fear and insecurity has forced the family to move. 
Racism is changing in the UK. If the crude forms of racism of industrial capitalism 
were directed at the workers from the West Indies and Indian subcontinent 
brought in to fill postwar labour shortages, the racism of postindustrial capitalism 
is being directed at new migrants who find themselves providing the manpower for 
ever more flexible labour markets, and at ‘settled’ migrants who have been forced 
into the twilight worlds of the service economy. It is a racism embedded in 
neoliberalism, set against a backdrop of globalisation, where towns and cities 
reflect a national picture of poverty entrenched amid prosperity. It is a racism 
where the poor and poorer still are left to fight it out over deregulated employment, 
as social protections are steadily eroded. 
Racism as everyday violence is a common occurrence.1 In 2011/12, police forces 
recorded over 37,000 racially or religiously aggravated crimes, over 100 per day, 
in England and Wales.2 The Crime Survey for England and Wales suggests that 
this is just a fraction of the actual number.3Even taking into account the limitations 
of ‘official’ statistics, the figures give some indication of the extent of the 
humiliating verbal abuse, taunts, harassment and assaults that form the backdrop 
to so many people’s lives. Yet this is not reflected in the general perception of the 
issue, nor is such violence usually deemed newsworthy. It has been dealt with, 
goes the orthodoxy, in the Macpherson Inquiry and Report (1999) into the murder 
of Stephen Lawrence and subsequent police activity. Hence, in 2012, the 
conviction of two of Lawrence’s killers, nineteen years after his murder, was 
universally celebrated (including by the police who had been so complicit in the 
injustice originally meted out to his family). While the pervasive, even institutional, 
racism of the criminal justice system may, it was felt, have initially underpinned 
the failure to track down the killers, that was now all in the past. Anodyne 
messages that there was ‘more to be done’ were trotted out by politicians, 
newspaper editors and opinion formers, insinuating that, though the country might 
be blemished by the odd bit of racism and discrimination, Britain was ultimately 
heading in the right direction. 
What follows suggests something different. It has its origins in a report published 
by the Institute of Race Relations in 2010 called Racial Violence: the buried issue, 
which analysed over 600 racist attacks over a one-year period.4 More 
immediately, it draws from an investigation into the patterns of racial violence in 
three relatively small UK cities which followed this report: Plymouth, Stoke-on-
Trent and Peterborough.5 In the first instance, the patterns we have identified 
provide evidence of a changing geography of racial violence which is spreading 
from the urban to the suburban: from the metropolitan cities historically associated 
with racist attacks, to smaller areas which do not necessarily have these same 
histories. Second, they further indicate how the scope of racist attacks is 
widening, incorporating new targets and intensifying violence. Each of these cities 
is experiencing relatively recent population changes, be it from the dispersal of 
asylum seekers, the natural growth of BME communities, the drawing in of 
migrant workers to restructured economies, the pull-in of international students or, 
simply, the outward flight of better-off white families. In Plymouth, for example, in 
south-west England, the proportion of the city’s residents from a BME community 
increased from 1.6 per cent in 2001, to about 9.1 per cent in 2009. This population 
shift was related to (among other factors) the dispersal of asylum seekers, a drive 
to increase the number of international students and the natural growth of existing 
BME communities. 
But in addition to these economic and social changes, a new ‘common sense’ 
racism is also permeating national policy-making and practice. It asserts that the 
UK is under persistent threat – from Muslims whose faith is deemed antithetical to 
its values and identity; from asylum seekers and migrant communities whose very 
presence threatens to impoverish it; and from black communities whose cultural 
mores are infecting it (turning the whites black, according to the prominent 
historian, David Starkey).6 It is a racism which is passed off as pragmatism and 
legitimised as economically and culturally necessary. This is the climate that 
fosters and sustains racial violence. 
If the anti-racist struggles of a generation ago recognised that combating racist 
attacks necessarily involved challenging the state’s denial that racism existed, 
then the anti-racist struggles of today necessarily involve challenging the state’s 
denial of its own complicity in creating such racism. And it is in the places where 
racism is spreading, apparently unchecked and well below the radar of 
mainstream political concern, that the impact of this denial is being played out. 
From racism to pragmatism 
Increasingly among policy-makers, academics and intellectuals, there is a 
propensity to talk of the UK as entering an age of hyper-, supra-, or super-
diversity.7 The exact terminology varies, but reflects the demographic changes 
which have taken place over the last few decades and are continuing apace. 
These changes, a swirling consequence of the UK’s former and ongoing imperial 
adventures, the end of the cold war, the expansion of the European Union, the 
crippling debt burdens and poverty forced upon the global South and the seismic 
upheavals engendered by globalisation, are here to stay. The responses to them, 
including an equally swirling mix of rancorous press campaigns and state policies 
and practices managing and controlling ‘race’ are reshaping the parameters of 
racism in the twenty-first century. 
The creation of multicultural Britain has been a predominantly ‘urban’ experience, 
particularly in the context of a postwar demand for labour in the manufacturing 
and service industries. These patterns of migration have continued to shape the 
geography of demographics; London and those towns and cities which imported 
labour in this period remain by far the most ethnically mixed parts of the UK. (In 
2009, about 45 per cent of England and Wales’ BME population lived in London.8) 
Yet what those who claim the dawn of a new epoch refer to is not just the fact of 
ethnic and religious diversity, but its kind and its local distribution. According to 
one academic, this incorporates not just the diversity of old, but patterns of 
migration that have accelerated since the 1990s. (Such patterns, for example, 
have come to include those formally seeking protection and those with fewer 
restrictions on their movement as a result of European Union expansion.9) 
Unlike the migrations of ‘old’, this ‘new’ migration is increasingly geographically 
dispersed. Although it predominantly affects the UK’s major urban centres, it is 
also being experienced on a greater scale in smaller towns and cities; in addition 
it is impacted upon by the internal migrations of existing BME 
communities.10 Whereas fewer than 6 per cent of the population of England and 
Wales were from a BME background in 1991, this had risen to 13 per cent in 2001 
and about 20 per cent in 2011. ‘Groups outside the white British majority are 
increasing in size and share, not just in the areas of initial migration, but 
throughout the country,’ some demographers have claimed, before adding ‘and 
our projections suggest that this trend is set to continue’.11 
It is against this backdrop, and, more specifically, the policies established to 
‘manage’ and stem population change, as well as the fears stoked up by 
demonising it, that a new geography of racial violence has begun to emerge 
across the UK. Many of those who talk of an age of diversity merely point out that 
the UK’s demography is shifting. But throughout the twenty-first century, the idea 
that ‘diversity’ (never mind ‘super-diversity’) threatens solidarity and identity – a 
concept once the domain of the political Right – has been normalised. 
Multiculturalism is now regarded as one of the key determinants of an array of ills 
ranging from rioting to terrorist attack.12 ‘Race relations’ policy has been reworked 
to both assimilate and exclude (internally, through a vernacular of community 
cohesion and integration and externally, through reform of immigration and 
asylum legislation) on the basis of perceived cultural adaptability of the new 
migrants and economic benefit to the nation.13 In all of this, considerable effort 
has been taken to maintain that the management of diversity is nothing more than 
an exercise in pragmatism: a necessary step for a benevolent nation on the cusp 
of being overwhelmed. 
Hence, a range of commentators, thinktanks and opinion formers on population 
change have been accorded the status of experts, with their ‘analyses’ 
regurgitated by the media and insinuated into policy debates. Migration Watch 
UK, for example, a well-known privately funded thinktank, has, for a decade, 
lobbied about immigration, with its findings cited extensively and uncritically as 
impartial knowledge. Bolstered by an advisory council drawn from former and 
existing members of academe, business sectors and the judiciary (among others), 
the organisation’s achievements to date include providing research for a cross-
party parliamentary group on ‘balanced migration’ and a petition, publicised by the 
press and signed, at one point, by 1,000 people per hour, calling on the 
government to ‘get immigration down to a level which will stabilise the 
population’.14 
Migration Watch UK is, of course, only one source of ideas on managing 
population change, but it shows how the repeated projection of apocalyptic future 
scenarios can trickle down – and up. In the mid-2000s, taking inspiration from a 
government report arguing that the pace of population change was ‘simply too 
great in some areas at present’, it congratulated policy-makers on restricting one 
avenue of immigration whilst simultaneously arguing that ‘there is clear evidence 
of a link between the proportion of ethnic minorities in a particular area and the 
rate at which the white population has declined’.15 These and similar findings have 
fuelled a media storm about ‘minority white cities’ – held up as a signifier of the 
UK’s dystopian future unless radical remedial action is taken. No matter that, as 
the academics Nissa Finney and Ludi Simpson have expertly shown, much of the 
information on which these views are based comes from a hodgepodge of (wilful) 
statistical misinterpretation and untruth. They nonetheless result in the 
perpetuation of myths – about integration, segregation and migration – that have 
permeated mainstream politics.16 The prime minister, for example, in his first 
major speech on immigration after taking power (heralded as a forthright 
assessment of how migration threatens ‘our’ way of life) explained how ‘For too 
long, immigration has been too high’, maintaining that it was ‘untruthful and unfair’ 
not to talk about it. Population change, he said, was leading to ‘discomfort and 
disjointedness’, and the ‘largest influx of people Britain has ever had’ was placing 
‘real pressure on communities’.17 
Of course, there are debates to be had about the real pressure being put on 
communities throughout the UK. What else could follow the biggest transfer of 
public money into private hands Britain has ever seen, as a result of the banking 
and financial crisis and the government’s savage austerity measures, hollowing 
out the basis of communities and forcing people into unemployment. Decades of 
neoliberalism have already torn out the heart of many former industrial towns and 
cities,18 concentrating economic power in the capital and the south-east of 
England, so that now the richest 10 per cent in the country own more than half of 
its overall wealth, compared to less than 1 per cent owned by the poorest 10 per 
cent. In the process, neoliberalism has eroded many ties of community solidarity 
in favour of fostering a winner-takes-all morality, elevating entrepreneurialism and 
competition as the way to order human interaction.19 Such factors shape the 
context in which population change, increasingly being experienced beyond the 
urban areas with which it is historically associated, is, indeed, an issue that many 
local authorities are suddenly having to respond to. 
Holding such debates requires an understanding of the processes of globalisation 
which have impoverished and uprooted millions, some of whom have ended up on 
Britain’s shores. It is globalisation, as both the expresser and facilitator of 
fundamental shifts in the nature and operation of capitalism that, within the UK, 
has transformed the economy and led to a perpetual state of poverty within 
prosperity. But these are issues which those formulating or implementing policies 
to deal with ‘super-diversity’ do not reckon with. Instead, the problem is reduced to 
the management of race, necessitating a series of techniques devoid of context. A 
few nods to the ‘richness’ of ‘diversity’ are offset against calls to manage and limit 
the ‘negative effects’ of migration. Britain, the narrative goes, has been paralysed 
for too long by political correctness and unable to speak out against the negative 
impacts of population change (be it externally, from migration, or internally, from 
the ‘natural’ growth and movement of BME communities). Hence, it is necessary 
to seize the moment. This is not ‘racism’ (as the columnists, spokespeople, 
opinion formers, thinktanks and intellectuals are always at pains to point out), but 
bravery;20 for if these issues are not tackled head-on, then the real beneficiary will 
be the far Right. But the potential for an honest conversation is never realised, as 
the most powerful voices arguing that diversity erodes the national ‘ties that bind’ 
crowd out all others. 
New geographies of racism 
Economic decline 
To understand the current trend, the city of Stoke-on-Trent is a good starting 
point. Stoke, in north Staffordshire, embodies what economic commentator Aditya 
Chakrabortty calls the UK’s ‘de-industrial revolution’:21 a revolution that has led to 
a fall in the number of people employed in manufacturing from about 6.5 million in 
1979 to about 2.5 million some thirty years later (or almost 30 per cent of Britain’s 
national income to about 12 per cent in the same period). Once a global 
manufacturing heartland, Stoke’s pottery industry was practically annihilated by 
the ruthless transfer of production to lower-wage economies overseas, going from 
employing about 50,000 people in the 1970s to about 7,000 in 2011. Legacies of 
its industry, though, remain. They are there in the attempts by the local authority 
to kick-start a tourist drive, enticing visitors to see the once-working factories – a 
reminder of England’s industrial past; in the older generation’s chronically high 
levels of workplace illnesses such as respiratory tuberculosis and lung cancer; 
and in the fact that the transition to a service economy has done little to alter the 
reality that over half of Stoke’s population are, according to government statistics, 
in the most deprived quintile in England and the city has some of the highest 
levels of child poverty in the country.22 
Stoke briefly hit the headlines in 2001, when Asian and white youths took to the 
streets to protect their homes from the potential threat of fascist marches. Against 
a backdrop of uprisings by Asians in several (mainly northern) towns and cities, 
fighting against fascists and the police, it was one of several incidents that led to 
the emergence of the ‘community cohesion’ agenda: a policy framework 
underpinned, essentially, by an argument that the disorders had happened 
because some communities were leading ‘parallel lives’ to mainstream society, 
and were, thus, proof of the ‘failure’ of multiculturalism.23 While this policy position 
came to dominate political orthodoxy, Stoke itself quickly resumed its former 
position as somewhere generally ignored by the political classes unless 
something major happens. And so, when something major did happen, seven 
years later, it shook the political establishment. By 2008, the city had nine 
extreme-right British National Party (BNP) councillors; the organisation had 
established itself as the main opposition to the Labour party, and there was a 
credible possibility that Stoke could become the first city controlled by the far 
Right in the UK. That it didn’t was down to a combination of dedicated anti-fascist 
campaigning and, to a lesser extent, the BNP’s own internal infighting. Yet, amid 
all the hand-wringing by the major parties that followed (the national Labour party 
went so far as to parachute in its own election candidate in an attempt to claw 
back voters), what was ignored was that the BNP had been able to draw on a 
combination of local concerns about poverty and the lurch to the racist Right in 
mainstream politics. It was this that was leading to a changing geography of racial 
violence way beyond the confines of this one city. 
The demonisation of asylum seekers 
Nowhere was this clearer at the beginning of the twenty-first century than with 
regard to asylum seekers. Vilified by politicians and press as thieves and liars, 
they were frequently dispersed to the run-down areas of smaller towns and cities 
throughout the UK where they could easily be marked out. Not surprisingly, this 
resulted (and continues to result) in localised climates of hostility. Dispersal, as 
Arun Kundnani has argued, produced ‘its own anti-dispersal: a not-in-my-
backyard mobilisation, in which each locality fought to have asylum seekers 
moved on somewhere else’.24 In many cases this was reinforced by local 
politicians and local media which reiterated the messages of their national 
counterparts; condemning the presence of a group of people uniformly depicted 
as a mass of scroungers was easily passed off as simply a defence of the rights 
of more longstanding residents. In Peterborough, for example, the mayor 
described his own city as a ‘crime-ridden, rubbish-strewn hellhole’, arguing that it 
had gone into ‘asylum meltdown’ and railing against those who had learned to 
‘milk the system’. Three local councillors wrote an open letter to the leaders of the 
three main political parties, lamenting how population change had led to an 
increase in crime, a climate of fear and the overwhelming of services. Just two 
years after the national policy of dispersal had begun, police revealed that they 
had recorded two thousand racist attacks against asylum seekers throughout 
England and Wales,25 a pattern of violence which has continued. At their most 
extreme, such attacks have proved fatal.26 But murders are only the most brutal 
end points of the emergence of a specific form of violent racism which has led to 
children being hounded from schools, adults being hounded from their homes, 
and families being hounded from the towns and cities where they have sought 
safety. 
Islamophobia and anti-Muslim racism 
Such attacks indicate what can happen when a particular group is used as a 
political scapegoat, but refugees are not the only group under threat. 
Islamophobia, embedded within the war on terror, has fuelled anti-Muslim 
violence across the UK;27 proving deadly in some cases.28 As this violence has 
continued over the last decade, it has morphed from unprovoked attacks on 
individuals – including the ripping off of niqabs, spitting and assaults – to 
encompass anything seen as Islamic. Bolstered by a set of conspiracy theories 
about ‘Islamification’, violence is frequently directed against mosques, Islamic 
centres and institutions. These are attempts literally to stop Islam from having any 
foothold in British cities – even buildings set to be converted into mosques have 
been vandalised to the point of obliteration. ‘Burn the lot of them out’, wrote a 
former soldier on Facebook just before he ran a gas-pipe into a mosque in Stoke 
in 2010.29Attacks of such kind throughout the UK are becoming routine.30 
Climates of fear 
There are others, too, living in a climate of fear: the migrant workers who are 
employed in economies that have been radically transformed over the last 
decades. In Peterborough, a city which has increasingly turned to its outlying 
agricultural hinterlands in the face of economic difficulties, migrant labour has 
become more and more embedded within its economy. Such is the extent of this 
economic restructuring, that, in 2009, one in every five jobs in the city was going 
to migrant workers, many of whom were from the eastern European countries that 
entered the EU in 2004 and 2007. And what has since happened reveals some of 
the real costs of the UK’s ruthless demand for cheap labour. With many workers 
exploited to the point of near slavery and then fired to make way for new ones, 
over time, a series of makeshift tent-villages began to appear on roundabouts and 
in parks, providing accommodation for the desperate and destitute. The hostility 
generated was predictable: one councillor called them ‘vagrants’ and a ‘drain’ on 
other residents, telling the press, ‘If they are not going to contribute to this country, 
then, as citizens of their home country, they should return there.’ Some residents 
evidently had their own ideas about how to help this process along, taking matters 
into their own hands and torching the tents. 
Racial violence is now structured into postindustrial Britain, particularly its night-
time economy where ‘new’ migrants and asylum seekers alongside ‘older’ 
discarded BME workers feel the brunt of unemployment as industries are 
dismantled.31 Yet, as discrimination locked them out of work in mainstream 
employment, and lack of capital prevented them establishing large-scale 
enterprises, alternative employment sectors such as taxis, restaurants and take-
aways – where racism is now routine – became the only options.32 Workers, 
frequently un-unionised and working alone, bear the brunt of alcohol-fuelled 
violence. In Stoke, for example, the violence directed against those BME 
communities working in its night-time economy over the last few years has 
involved lumps of masonry being thrown at people, demands for takeaway staff to 
hand over protection money and taxi-drivers having to barricade themselves in 
their vehicles. Meanwhile, in Plymouth, a city reeling from the gradual hollowing 
out of its shipbuilding and defence industries that has turned to the service sector 
in a drive to restructure its economy around tourism, racist attacks within the 
night-time economy reached such proportions that, in 2000, specialist police 
initiatives were developed in response, such as installing audio and video 
recording equipment in businesses. Some taxis in the city display stickers bluntly 
telling potential customers that the driver is ‘English’, giving them the opportunity 
to choose a white driver. 
The politics of hate 
Racial violence is spreading against a backdrop of generalised hostility to what is 
increasingly dubbed ‘super-diversity’; hostility that has been normalised as 
pragmatic ‘common sense’. A lethal combination of capitalist restructuring and 
policies to ‘manage’ diversity by targeting the ‘diverse’ have created the climate 
for racial violence to flourish. But policy-makers now, post Macpherson and 
influenced by a neoliberal world view in which social ills are caused by individuals’ 
shortcomings, rather than social and economic inequities, are revising how such 
violence should be viewed and combated. Now racial violence is part of a ‘hate 
crime’ agenda. 
The term ‘hate crime ’originated in the US,33 but the hate crime ‘agenda’ in the UK 
can be traced back to the New Labour government’s flagship legislation, the 
Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (enacted just prior to the Macpherson 
Report).34 This introduced higher maximum penalties for crimes designated as 
being racially aggravated; i.e. motivated in part by an individual perpetrator’s 
racial hatred. The concept of hate crime has consequently come to prominence in 
the workings of the criminal justice system. At its core is a rhetorical commitment 
to criminalise hatred, bringing to bear the full force of criminal justice agencies 
and, if applicable, the penal system in a drive which is both punitive and symbolic. 
The former, by way of an assumption that the way to combat racism is through 
longer prison sentences and harsher punishment; the latter by way of an 
assumption that it is criminalisation that sends out a message that the state is 
taking racism seriously. ‘While people continue to be attacked and even killed 
because of who they are, we owe it to them, their families and their communities 
to carry on the fight against hatred’, says the latest Equalities Minister.35 Yet, what 
the amalgamation of hate crime definitions into the workings of the state has done 
is to invert the gaze from the world to the individual. ‘Hate crime’ displaces racism 
(once again36) from the social (and political) to the psychological – and thereby 
absolves the state of institutionalising racism. 
In itself, this is somewhat ironic. One of the triggers for a concerted focus on the 
devastating impacts of racial violence was, as alluded to above, the Macpherson 
Report. It stated publicly and officially – verifying what generations of community 
activists had been saying for years – that a reality of brutal racist attacks could not 
be divorced from an equally brutal reality of police indifference, criminal justice 
inertia and ultimately institutional racism.37 Yet what has emerged in the years 
following the report is what sociologist Henry Giroux has described (in relation to 
the US) as a racialisation of politics combined with a personalising of racism.38 In 
this, the state creates the conditions for racist violence at exactly the same time 
as it promises to amass greater powers to combat it. Institutional racism is being 
erased from public debate (aside from a nod to, e.g., glass ceilings in elite 
professions),39 even as the tracking down and imprisonment of racist offenders is 
triumphantly celebrated. Successful prosecutions are circulated through a local 
press always eager for positive criminal justice stories, and an image of continual 
reform is maintained. That all kinds of interracial crimes, including those involving 
young black men using the word white about police during an altercation, are now 
being prosecuted as ‘hate crimes’ serves to further inflate the notional significance 
of ‘hate’. 
In part, this stems from the division of hate crime into a series of ‘strands’, 
whereby racism is located alongside other (in policy-speak) ‘personal 
characteristics’. Racism, in this context, is seen alongside homophobia, 
homophobia alongside disability crimes, disability crimes alongside crimes against 
transgender people, and so on. All, of course, are groups that suffer horrific abuse 
and that face multiple forms of prejudice. But what this leads to is a categorisation 
of hate crime in which all vie for an equal status of victimhood. It creates a form of 
identity politics; not to be included is seen as a kind of insult, as proof that such 
and such a victimhood is not taken seriously. So, after the Crime and Disorder Act 
1998 came into force, it was followed by calls to encourage the government to 
create tougher sentencing criteria for other potential crimes of ‘hate’ such as 
medical condition, political opinion and sexual orientation.40 In 2003, the Criminal 
Justice Act placed a duty on the courts to increase the sentence of any offence 
deemed to be aggravated by the victim’s disability or sexual orientation.41 The 
current definition of hate crime focuses on disability, gender-identity, race, religion 
or faith and sexual orientation.42 
Partners in (hate) crime 
From the 1950s to the 1990s BME people fought to get racial violence accepted 
as a crime. They marched, picketed police stations, formed community patrols, 
asserted in court that ‘self defence was no offence’. They created grassroots anti-
racist monitoring groups and, in the 1980s,even some progressive local 
authorities monitored racial violence and the police. This was a learning process 
for the community and an education for the local state. But those days of politics 
are over. 
The hate crime agenda enables the criminal justice system, in conjunction with a 
host of ‘partners’ from the statutory and non-statutory world, to define what racism 
is and how it should be dealt with. With organisations representing various victims’ 
groups forced into a bizarre competition to have their cause acknowledged by the 
government, their struggles have often consequently been focused on finding 
space to be accommodated within local frameworks of crime control, rather than 
asking critical questions of these agencies. And in this context, a whole sub-tier of 
professional bodies and organisations has either been established or had their 
work adapted over the last decade. Hate crime has been structured into the local 
state, embedded and professionalised within local authorities through an array of 
hate crime officers, diversity representatives, criminal justice agencies and those 
established ‘third-sector’ organisations which have been recognised as having a 
legitimate stake in the hate crime world. 
At its core, such an approach dovetails with an increasing enthusiasm for multi-
agency working, accelerated by the New Labour government but continued by the 
Coalition, which has subtly restructured the basis of state power.43 Through a 
plethora of networks and multi-agency meetings, such working groups rely on 
securing consent for the policing of ‘hate’. This approach echoes practices that 
were put in place in the 1980s after the urban uprisings in Brixton, Mosside, 
Toxteth, Chapeltown and other inner-city areas. The encouragement of a network 
of trusted partners and liaison bodies, linked together through a series of strategy 
meetings and working groups, harks back to Scarman’s consultative committees 
which, according to critics, were exercises in co-opting the community into 
policing.44 Similarly, today the fight against racism is being removed from those 
communities feeling its effects to be relocated within local institutional structures. 
This has particular resonance in areas which are suddenly experiencing racism in 
its most raw form and do not have traditions of anti-racist campaigning at 
community level. This is not to denigrate the often tireless work of some 
individuals in racial equality councils and other organisations who seek, often with 
little support, to counter racial injustice. But it is to say that, in the absence of 
community-based networks, local authorities and criminal justice agencies have 
appropriated anti-racism, deflecting its politics and muting its anger, and locating it 
as a professional service working within the structures of the state. On the one 
hand, this has manifested itself in the plethora of community cohesion projects 
aimed at encouraging ‘mixing’, good neighbourliness and shared values. If ‘hate’ 
stems from the individual, the thinking goes, then it is the government’s 
responsibility to reduce tensions by creating the space for shared activities and 
cross-community contact.45 On the other, the government, as well as the criminal 
justice system, have created a network of ‘partners’ and stakeholders at both 
national and, through multi-agency working, local, levels. And it is through these 
structures that officially sanctioned partnerships can define among themselves 
what the priorities are in fighting ‘hate’. Thus, organisations working within the 
structures of the hate crime agenda decide which communities are in need of 
‘protection’, where police officers may most effectively be deployed, and so on. 
The problem, though, is that, in practice, such partnerships are unequal, with the 
police and local authorities having most power.46 The consequence is that 
alliances made between different partners fighting ‘hate’ can break down when 
community-based concerns come up against the aims of more powerful partners. 
In Peterborough, for example, when the English Defence League (EDL) held a 
protest at the end of 2010, the police persuaded young Muslims to avoid the area, 
discouraging them from holding a counter-protest, on the pretext of maintaining 
order. This was presented as a deal under which the police said that, if the 
counter-demonstration was not held, they would contain the EDL. Yet, in the 
event, the EDL came to the city and its members were allowed by police to gather 
and give particularly insulting speeches, calling the prophet a paedophile. Such 
scenes – of police forces and local authorities dissipating local protest against the 
EDL – have been replicated elsewhere. In Leicester, for instance, the police and 
the city council ‘undertook a wide-ranging programme to dissuade local people 
from engaging with or taking part in lawful marches and assemblies on 
4thFebruary [2012]’, according to the Network for Police Monitoring (NETPOL).47 
Ultimately, the appropriation of ‘anti-racism’ allows state agencies to present 
themselves as a set of neutral institutions working to ensure public order for all by 
intervening in the tensions between communities. This, in turn, enables the 
policing of ‘race’ to go relatively unchallenged. So, in response to new social 
issues associated with demographic change, a series of intensifying criminal 
justice and immigration strategies have been put in place that have met little 
resistance. Thus, for example, in Peterborough, migrant workers forced to live in 
tents in abject poverty, exploited and destitute, were subjected to new forms of 
immigration raids. Police, UK Border Agency (UKBA) staff and local authority 
officers prowled the city, rounding up this new class of homeless, backed up by a 
compliant, embedded media – including the BBC.48 The official line that these 
immigration sweeps were actually for the benefit of those being subjected to them, 
that facilitating their removal from the country would help them, raised barely a 
murmur. Questions were never asked about the viability or morality of bodies such 
as UKBA, the police and local authorities criminalising communities and 
enhancing racism, even as they worked ‘in partnership’ on hate crime strategies. 
The reality is that the rhetorical commitment to stamp out racism has emerged at 
exactly the same time as a reinvigorated commitment to deal with, criminalise and 
discipline ‘race’. Not only has this criminalisation been driven by ideological shifts 
in racism, such as the targeting of Muslims under the rubric of anti-terrorism,49 it is 
set against a backdrop of the targeting and surveillance of communities by the 
criminal justice system that has become entrenched as the damaging impacts of 
neoliberalism have taken hold. As Sivanandan has described it: ‘Thirty years of 
neoliberalism and financialisation’ have broken up the working class into a 
‘precariat’ and an (officially termed) ‘residual’ social group ‘of the never-employed, 
estate denizens, inner-city youth, refugees, asylum seekers – the flotsam and 
jetsam of market society’.50 It is this sub-section of the populace – those who 
make up the ‘collateral damage of unchecked market economics’51 – multicultural 
in make-up, but in which BME communities are overrepresented, that is seen as 
needing to be managed and contained by the criminal justice system. And, where 
there are no community networks to resist such inroads, what limited 
accountability there is often resides in infrastructures such as law centres or 
citizens’ advice bureaux which have adapted their remits; in those occasional 
radical staff members of racial equality councils; or in those support centres that 
have sprung up to provide advice and guidance to ‘new’ migrants. But these are 
exactly the sorts of organisations that are currently being starved of funding under 
the doctrine of austerity. They are some of those feeling the brunt of 40 per cent 
cuts to the legal aid budget and £95 billion cuts to public services.52 
The far Right and anti-white racism 
This replacement of an anti-racist movement and redefinition of hate crime as any 
criminal offence ‘motivated by hostility or prejudice based on a personal 
characteristic’,53 has opened up space for all kinds of groups to stake a claim that 
the ‘real’ racism is that faced by white (or, more specifically, white-British) people. 
The failure to acknowledge the role that state policies and practices play in setting 
the conditions for racial violence leaves only a definition of hate as springing from 
internalised rage or, at most, ongoing animosities between communities. In this 
conspectus, everyone has equal claim to being a victim of hate; everyone can 
potentially be an offender. 
Of course, the notion of anti-white racism is not new. The far Right has for 
decades aimed to promote and play on fears that a white majority is being overrun 
and overridden by hordes of immigrants.54 Nor are such ideas confined to the far 
Right. The perception that majority ‘culture’ is being diluted, for example, has long 
been a staple of the right-wing press (as well as certain thinktanks).55 But at a 
time when the claim that the UK’s ‘super-diversity’ poses a threat is legitimised by 
mainstream politics, ideas of anti-white racism have particular appeal. And it is in 
those areas undergoing forms of population change that they can rapidly gain 
purchase. 
The far Right’s appropriation of hate crime and success in turning it into a concept 
of anti-white racism can be partly gauged by its electoral support. The BNP 
managed to gain unprecedented popularity in the mid-2000s in various towns and 
cities in the UK for a combination of reasons. But it was buttressed by the way 
mainstream parties ceded ground to the far Right, ostensibly to prevent people 
from voting for it. Meanwhile, the BNP was able to manipulate the genuine 
concerns of white communities, over immigration, asylum and Islam, in those 
places which had been left to rot by mainstream political parties. 
Using the language of hate crime, far-right groups have made considerable efforts 
to assert that they are the ‘real’ victims. It is this, in part, that has provided the 
basis for continued far-right campaigning, despite electoral setbacks. Ironically, 
while the state’s commitment to combating hate crime appears to have increased 
as it has abandoned any real understanding of institutional racism, the EDL, the 
BNP and other far-right groups have seized the concept and used it for their own 
ends. Thus, whilst marches and rallies are still mobilised against the building of 
mosques and Islamic centres, they are increasingly also held to protest that the 
criminal justice system is institutionally biased against white people.56 And they 
are held in defence of Christian values that, it is claimed, are being ‘eroded’ by a 
political elite too paralysed by political correctness to defend the interests of the 
nation.57 And they are held in ‘remembrance’ of white people who have been 
killed or injured in what they allege are racist attacks. In Stoke, for example, after 
a BNP supporter was killed in 2008 by his Muslim neighbour, whom he had 
subjected to years of racist abuse and harassment, the BNP presented him as a 
‘white martyr’.58 
Such cynical attempts to make political capital from horrific incidents have been 
resisted by bereaved family members who have condemned the far Right for 
attempting to gain support.59But, worse, the fall-out of such far-right organising 
can be detected in an enhanced climate of violence: the Kurdish family forced to 
barricade themselves in their own takeaway from a baying mob of EDL members 
in Plymouth, for example, or the taxi-drivers forced to stop working on the eve of 
an EDL march in Stoke after receiving death threats. 
The parameters of racial violence have changed dramatically over the last two 
decades: geographically (the phenomenon has spread), conceptually (it has been 
redefined as hate crime), politically (it has been claimed by the far Right) and 
strategically (it is being managed by state and private agencies not combated by 
the community). And all at a time when the age of austerity cuts financial support 
to community infrastructures and creates the conditions of competition among the 
poor and poorer where racial violence can thrive. Local activists, anxious to deal 
with popular racism and racial attacks, for want of radical left strategies, still look 
hopefully over their shoulders to local authorities to help set up community 
initiatives, without seeing the extent to which local authorities are now 
compromised. Such an understanding, of course, is made all the harder as 
popular discourse divorces violent racism from its political, economic and 
ideological contexts. Obviously one cannot just replicate old struggles in new 
conditions, but we can learn from the lessons of the past and remould them into 
contemporary struggles. All the conditions are there and all the possible allies. 
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